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Abstract
The foreign fighter phenomenon in Syria and Iraq has led to many worries about the potential negative 
consequences that might occur in the near future. The scenario of returned foreign fighters launching attacks in 
the West is by far the most prominent one. This article aims to broaden the discussion on the potential fallout of 
the phenomenon by examining three particular dimensions: the physical threat (including the terrorist threat), 
ideological consequences, and societal consequences. After presenting these dimensions, three historical cases of 
jihadi foreign fighting (Afghanistan, Bosnia and Somalia) are examined to see to what extent different types of 
fallout materialized. The final part of the article attempts to gauge which indicators or signs of potential fallout 
are already observable in the case of the on-going conflict in Syria and Iraq. If we seek to prepare ourselves for the 
future fallout of today’s foreign fighter phenomenon, we must look beyond the terrorist threat.
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Introduction
The conflict in Syria and Iraq has attracted tens of thousands of foreign fighters [1] of which five to six thousand have come from Europe.[2] This has created serious concerns in European countries about the possible negative consequences, or fallout, of the foreign fighter phenomenon, particularly in the 
form of the potential terrorist threat posed by returning fighters. It is this scenario of returned foreign fighters 
staging attacks in Western countries that has featured most prominently in the majority of studies into the 
potential fallout of foreign fighting.[3] This specific angle that is mainly emphasized by counterterrorism 
professionals dominates the debate and overshadows other types of fallouts that we might have to face.
This article aims to contribute to a more comprehensive overview of the potential fallout of the foreign 
fighter phenomenon. It will do so by first exploring the often-mentioned physical threat in the form of 
terrorism and other types of violence that might be traced to foreign fighters. The focus will not be limited 
to short-term terrorist threats and violence in Western countries as longer-term consequences and those for 
the countries where these fighters go to will also be discussed. The second dimension that will be studied is 
ideology. Foreign fighting may lead to a growing appeal of, in this case, transnational jihadi ideology and 
bring with it an increased potential for recruitment by movements linked to that ideology. The third and final 
dimension that will be explored concerns the societal consequences of the foreign fighter phenomenon, such 
as polarization and securitization within the countries that the fighters depart from, reintegration in home 
countries as well as in post-conflict countries, and problems on a more personal level such as Post-Traumatic 
Stress Disorder (PTSD) and broken families.[4]
The aim is not to present a complete list of all forms of fallout but rather to broaden the current discussion by 
highlighting three particular aspects. The focus will be on jihadi foreign fighters, the dominant foreign fighter 
phenomenon of today, and the potential fallout of the conflict in Syria and Iraq. The first part of the article 
provides an overview of the three types of fallout (physical, ideological and societal). In the second part, these 
aspects of fallout are examined in three cases of jihadi foreign fighting: Afghanistan, Bosnia, and Somalia. It 
can be shown that certain types of fallout are prominent in some cases, but less so in others. The final part 
examines what fallout is to be expected from today’s presence of European foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq.
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Types of Fallout
The Physical Threat
The first type of fallout is the violence and physical threat linked to foreign fighters. This includes the 
potential terrorist threat posed by returning foreign fighters who could come back further radicalized, 
battle-hardened, and subsequently use their experience and extremist links to launch new attacks.[5] This 
could happen during or after the conflict. Conversely, “wannabe” or failed foreign fighters who are unable 
to reach jihadi battlefields–regardless of whether they are stopped by the authorities or denied access by 
foreign fighter groups–might choose to engage in terrorism at home instead. Another scenario is that of 
sleeper cells that are instructed to stay under the radar for years before being reactivated to launch attacks. A 
final example linked to a terrorist threat in the home country originates from the presence of networks that 
are involved in recruitment and logistical support for groups in conflict zones. These networks might also 
broaden their activities and start focusing on home countries, effectively bridging the divide between foreign 
and domestic activities, such as has been studied extensively by Petter Nesser.[6] He has shown how jihadi 
plots in Europe “usually involve interaction between a cell and extremist networks in the attack country, as 
well as international networks”.[7]
Similarly, as there might be a nexus between domestic and foreign activities, there might also be a so-called 
“terrorism-crime”-nexus. This debated topic within terrorism studies has gained more attention in recent 
years.[8] Some scholars suggest that we should refrain from seeing terrorist organizations and “classical” 
criminal organizations as two contrasting types of either fully politically or non-politically motivated 
organizations.[9] Terrorist organizations often engage in criminal activities, such as robberies, drug 
trafficking or money-laundering to finance their operations. Besides the possible involvement of networks 
that support foreign fighters via criminal activities, foreign fighters might also use their experience to 
participate in other types of criminal activities upon return.
Another example of a physical threat is the impact foreign fighters could have on local conflicts.[10] An often 
suggested implication is that foreign fighters could broaden such conflicts by getting other parties that either 
support or fight them involved, or use their presence as an excuse to escalate a pre-existing conflict with local 
or regional adversaries. These fighters could also form new or strengthen existing terrorist organizations. 
Following insights from the field of negotiation studies, this could mean that conflict resolution could 
become more complicated, or that different negotiation strategies are required.[11] Many foreign fighters 
join the struggle of an insurgency against a state, vying for – in most cases – independence, change of 
government, or restoration of order. If foreign fighters join groups pursuing such causes and use terrorist 
tactics to that end, they might be called “conditional absolute terrorists who have something to negotiate 
about – territory, independence, conditions – even if their suicidal tactics are absolute”.[12] Another possible 
way in which foreign fighters could be linked to violence is by introducing more brutal tactics or different 
norms about what is allowed during combat, such as suicide attacks.
Another often-mentioned consequence for local conflicts is the impact foreign fighters might have on the 
strength and reputation of the side they are fighting for. It is often assumed that they strengthen the side they 
join in the battle. Kristin Bakke, however, has shown that it could also have the exact opposite effect.[13] 
This has been reconfirmed by more recent studies of Ben Rich and Dara Conduit, who have demonstrated 
that the presence of jihadi foreign fighters in Chechnya and Syria “have had a catastrophic impact on 
international and domestic perceptions of the opposition” and that “(i)n some cases, this has led observers to 
transfer support back to the antagonistic government, preferring the known government over the potentially 
destabilizing effects of a revolutionary jihadist regime”.[14]
In addition to the impact on the local conflict, foreign fighters could also be involved in violence outside the 
country itself. For instance, foreign fighters could continue to stay together after the conflict has terminated, 
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and look for other places where they could continue their jihad. This idea of foreign fighters “hijacking 
local conflicts” has been mentioned in many studies.[15] The fighters could also leave the country to set up 
training camps somewhere else. The formation of al-Qaida and its activities in multiple countries around the 
world are a case in point. According to David Malet, the fact that foreign fighters do not return to their home 
countries does not mean the fighters did not desire to do so. He claims that this often resulted from “the 
policies of their home and host states that prevented reintegration and created cohorts of stateless, and now 
professionalized, actors who perpetuate in weakly-governed conflict zones.”[16]
The Impact on Ideological Currents and Recruitment
A second type of fallout relates to the influence the foreign fighter phenomenon could have on the 
reinforcement and spread of their ideology. In this case, this applies to the transnational jihadi ideology 
that emerged from the 1980s conflict in Afghanistan. Foreign fighters usually claim to fight in defense of 
a certain community that is facing an existential threat. A “transnational identity” links these fighters to 
the community they are fighting for.[17] This transnational identity is derived from adhering to a certain 
ideology and being part of movements linked to that ideology. This partly explains why Communists 
from close to fifty countries joined the International Brigades in Spain in the 1930s fighting alongside the 
Republican side against the Fascists under General Franco. Similarly, it explains why jihadis in the 1980s 
came to Afghanistan to support the local fighters against the “infidel” Communists. The experience of foreign 
fighting can profoundly influence the course of development of a particular ideology, the heroic stories that 
are being told about the accomplishments of those who adhere to the ideology, and the ideas of what it means 
to be part of such movements.
One specific example is the formation of a “foreign fighter legacy”. Regardless of their military 
accomplishments, foreign fighters tend to build a positive narrative, portraying themselves as a brave fighting 
force. This narrative or “political myth” connects the ideology to the idea of the fighters defending a certain 
transnational community. This type of narrative can have a long-lasting impact if future generations in these 
movements continue to see themselves as defenders of certain communities, and act accordingly. Mohammed 
Hafez, for instance, has shown how a specific “subculture of volunteerism and martyrdom” that was born in 
Afghanistan remained to be highly influential in many subsequent conflicts.[18] Another example of how 
foreign fighters’ experiences could have a long-lasting influence on ideology is the formation of an enemy 
image. Fighting in a battle and, equally important, being attacked by others determines who is perceived as 
the enemy.[19] As a consequence, even those who are not directly involved in fighting against these foreign 
fighters but who condemn it or try to stop them from joining – such as authorities blocking fighters to leave 
– might also be seen as hostile actors. This determines the position vis-à-vis other actors and also contributes 
to narratives of the groups.
Another important aspect of ideological fallout is the splitting of local insurgent groups and the 
radicalization, or further “extremization” of certain groups, or an ideological current. This aspect has been 
studied by Rich and Conduit who conclude – with regard to the cases of Chechnya and Syria – that this has 
led to “a jihadization of the opposition”.[20] The jihadi foreign fighters managed to normalize the portrayal 
of the struggle in Chechnya as a civilizational clash between Islam and the rest of the world. It also led to a 
split in the opposition between those who saw the struggle more as a secular and nationalist one and those 
who stressed the jihadi and religious nature of it.[21] Similarly, splits in movements could also occur around 
methods that are permitted in combat, and ideas about where the next battle should be waged. It could also 
revolve around the question whether it is mainly a local fight or that a global agenda should be pursued.
In addition to these possible consequences relating to ideology formation, it could also strengthen the reach 
of an ideology. For instance, the presence of foreign fighters often manages to draw international attention 
to the conflict and the proclaimed cause they are fighting for. Thus, it might be used as a successful tool to 
85ISSN  2334-3745 December 2016
PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM Volume 10, Issue 6
draw (renewed) attention to a cause, and can be part of propaganda efforts to frame the conflict in a certain 
way. It could also provide renewed legitimacy to a cause or ideology that appears to have lost importance. 
The presence of foreign fighters could prove that certain transnational identities are relevant and need 
to be defended, such as happened when Abdullah Azzam stressed the individual obligations linked to 
transnational jihadism (to be discussed below). Another example of how the reach or appeal of an ideology 
could be strengthened is related to the earlier-mentioned foreign fighter legacy. Returned foreign fighters 
could enjoy a kind of street credibility and status as experienced fighters. Their role model and presence in 
certain communities could motivate a next generation to become foreign fighters.[22]
The Impact on Societies
A third and final type of fallout encompasses the consequences for societies. The foreign fighter phenomenon 
could, for instance, affect national policies and perceptions on (counter-) terrorism and related issues, such 
as immigration. Polarization could arise when foreign fighters are part of a particular ethnic, religious, or 
ideological group in the home country. The general population could become anxious about alleged support 
for militancy – or lack of public condemnation of it – among affected diaspora communities. Additionally, 
returning fighters will commonly be seen as a potential threat, resulting in public calls for fierce and 
immediate actions to counter this threat. Conversely, anxiety can stem from measures taken by authorities 
targeting these specific ethnic, religious or ideological groups. Furthermore, securitization could occur, 
which means that the issue of foreign fighters is increasingly perceived to be an important security threat, 
and that specific measures or resources need be mobilized to address it.[23] It could lead to higher levels 
of fear among the general population, or result in other (security) issues moving down the ladder of policy 
priorities, as resources and attention are devoted to this particular issue.[24]
Another example of societal consequences for the home countries is the reintegration process of returned 
fighters. Depending on the actions that have been linked to foreign fighters in the conflict zone (e.g. war 
crimes, beheadings, torture and rape), and the general stance of the authorities towards the foreign fighter 
phenomenon, returning fighters might be closely monitored, prosecuted, detained, or become part of 
intensive rehabilitation programs. This could result in a serious strain on the resources of various agencies, 
ranging from the public prosecution service, the prison system, the intelligence services to social workers or 
probation services involved in accompanying their return into society. The same applies to efforts to try to 
prohibit young Muslims from becoming foreign fighters.
Some of the societal consequences for the (post-)conflict country might be related to physical threats. For 
instance, disturbed relations between sectors of society could lead to violent clashes. In discussions about 
the (social) peace in a post-conflict country, these issues are often subsumed under the acronym “DDR” 
– disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. These are generally regarded to be key components of 
post-conflict peace consolidation, with re-integration being more society-oriented and disarmament and 
demobilization being more security-oriented.[25] Problems might arise when, for instance, foreign fighters 
choose to stay in the post-conflict country and refuse to disarm. They might ignore requests by the post-
conflict authorities to leave the country. In other cases, they are invited to stay and receive citizenship as a 
reward for their fighting efforts. The presence of these armed individuals and groups could lead to tensions, 
and become an obstacle towards a more peaceful future. When they disarm, there might still be barriers 
to full integration in the country, as they often adhere to different norms and habits. This could result in a 
strenuous and potentially volatile relationship with the local population. Pressure could also be put on the 
post-conflict authorities to prosecute or extradite these fighters if they are suspected of having been involved 
in war crimes or acts of terrorism. Unwillingness or inability to do so could damage the international 
reputation of the post-conflict country, and might result in these countries being labelled as “state sponsors of 
terrorism” and thereby become subject to sanctions.[26]
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At the individual, personal level, there are multiple forms of fallout. Most of these are predominantly 
relevant for the fighter himself, but some also have a clear impact on society. Two important examples are 
the consequences of Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), and the issue of broken families. Several studies 
have established a link between combat experience and a lack of training to cope with traumatic events on 
the one hand, and the risk of PTSD on the other.[27] It is also known that PTSD has serious ramifications 
for the quality of life of those affected, and might result in behavior that could endanger those suffering from 
PTSD as well as those in their immediate social surroundings. Combat exposure is linked to increased risks 
of abuse of a spouse, depression, and substance abuse.[28] Foreign fighters could thus introduce these kinds 
of problems into society upon their return. Then there is the impact on families. Foreign fighters frequently 
leave behind broken families in the home country who are in most cases confronted with the loss of a 
husband or son. This could affect the life of the family members, most obviously on the emotional level but 
also economically. These challenges might be further exacerbated when families are stigmatized or feel deeply 
hurt or ashamed because a family member has left to become a foreign fighter.[29]
Fallout from Historical Cases of Foreign Fighting
An examination of historical cases of foreign fighting illustrates how certain types of fallout might be present 
in some cases while being less relevant in others. Each case of foreign fighting has its own characteristics 
and dynamics that will determine whether or not certain forms of fallout can be identified. The following 
takes a brief look at the consequences of jihadi foreign fighting in three particular cases Afghanistan (1980s), 
Bosnia (1990s), and Somalia (2000s). These cases have been discussed in more detail elsewhere and are here 
used to concretize and illustrate the types of fallout that were discussed in more general terms earlier.[30] 
Admittedly, an examination of other cases of jihadi foreign fighting could lead to other results. The selection 
of these three cases is motivated by a desire to study the fallout of foreign fighting in different regions (South 
Asia, Europe, Africa) and different contexts (pre- and post-9/11).
The Physical Threat 
Examples of physical fallout can be seen in all three cases. It has been widely reported that foreign fighters 
who joined al-Shabaab in Somalia during the war against Ethiopia (2006-2009) introduced new methods 
of fighting such as suicide attacks.[31] One such attack was perpetrated by Abdulrahman Ahmed Haji, a 
Dane of Somali descent. Haji blew himself up during a college graduation ceremony and killed more than 20 
people, including three government ministers.[32]
In terms of exacerbating the conflict and rising tensions between the local population and foreign fighters, 
we have seen clear examples in Bosnia and Afghanistan. For instance, the Bosnian army tried to put an end 
to the ruthless behavior of foreign fighters who were involved in horrendous atrocities and who regarded the 
local Bosnians to be impious Muslims. A deputy of the Bosnian army told the Western press that “[i]t was 
a mistake to let [the foreign fighters] in here (…). They commit most of the atrocities and work against the 
interests of the Muslim people”.[33] In Afghanistan, the foreign fighters were regarded with much suspicion 
as well. Not only did many lack fighting experience and dedication, there were also “ideological and cultural 
frictions” between the foreign fighters and the local fighters.[34] Al-Shabaab offers another interesting 
example as it appears that some foreign fighters turned into targets for some local fighters. Since 2010, many 
who were deemed too critical of the leadership or too outspoken about internal affairs have been killed or 
prohibited from leaving the group.[35]
The scenario of experienced foreign fighters travelling to other conflict zones was most visible in Bosnia, 
where several Afghan veterans had joined the fight. After the Soviet Union had withdrawn its troops from 
Afghanistan in 1989, in-fighting intensified between the different groups. The fall of the Najibullah regime 
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in 1992 and the outbreak of the civil war made the idea of a defensive jihad, as had been propagated by 
Abdullah Azzam, redundant. The war in Bosnia proved to be an opportunity for a number of Afghan 
veterans – unwilling or unable to return home – to fight there. Furthermore, groups like al-Qaida recognized 
that Bosnia might offer an opportunity to set up training camps or eventually stage attacks against other 
enemies.[36] However, despite the hopes of some jihadi groups to use Bosnia as a “springboard” for 
terrorist activity elsewhere, this never materialized. The impact of such conflicts on the mobilization and 
radicalization processes of many jihadis in Europe was large, but rather reflects the ideological impact as will 
be discussed in the next section. The three cases provide examples of how the focal point of militancy can 
move from one jihadi theatre to another. The aftermath of the war in Afghanistan demonstrates how foreign 
fighters could continue their activities in other countries. This could be by way of direct engagement in other 
conflicts as well as take the form of a consolidation of a transnational terrorist network such as the one of al-
Qaida, that subsequently planned terrorist attacks in multiple countries.
Concerning the terrorist threat, we see some examples of returned foreign fighters who became involved 
in terrorism in their home country. One example is the so-called “Roubaix Gang”, of which two members, 
Christophe Caze and Lionel Dumont, had fought in Bosnia. They planned to detonate a car bomb during a 
G7-meeting in Lille, but the police disarmed the bomb and arrested the members.[37] Another foiled plot 
was linked to British-Jamaican fighter Andrew Rowe, who had not only fought in Bosnia, but allegedly also 
met with Islamists in other parts of the world. Rowe was arrested in 2003 on the French side of the Channel 
tunnel with traces of high explosives in his socks.[38] None of those European Bosnia returnees actually 
managed to stage a successful attack.
Another important insight is provided by studying the link between foreign fighting and radical activity – 
such as fundraising, propaganda, and recruitment for terrorism–in the home country. The clearest example 
is perhaps London where many foreign fighters found an environment in which they could focus on a variety 
of activities: giving radical sermons but also making connections between cells abroad and at home to help 
potential foreign fighters reaching conflict zones.[39] A study by Petter Nesser found similar scenarios 
emerging in several other European countries in the 1990s.[40]
The most well-known example of a threat posed by a foreign fighter, although not a returning one but 
someone who remained abroad, is Osama bin Laden, who plotted attacks in a foreign country against 
multiple other countries. Two of the 9/11 hijackers presumably also fought in Bosnia.[41] Other important 
examples are the attacks perpetrated by al-Shabaab in neighboring countries such as Kenya, Uganda and 
Ethiopia, although the direct involvement of foreign fighters remains unclear. Another case is offered by 
Michael Adelobajo. This British citizen apparently tried to join al-Shabaab in 2010 but was arrested by the 
Ethiopian authorities at the Somali border and was sent back to the UK. Three years later he killed the British 
soldier Lee Rigby on the streets of Woolwich, London.[42] This example shows how failed foreign fighters 
could equally pose a security threat.
Impact on Ideological Currents and Mobilization
The importance of the three episodes of foreign fighter experiences in terms of ideological fallout cannot be 
overestimated, particularly in the case of Afghanistan. Although the foreign fighters mostly played a marginal 
role during combat, their presence in the conflict zone contributed to the idea of a foreign fighter legacy that 
still resonates today. According to Petter Nesser, “it was the Arab volunteers in the anti-Soviet struggle who 
created the ideologies and movements that would become referred to as “jihadism”.[43] A key figure in the 
mobilization for the fight in Afghanistan was the Palestinian sheikh Abdullah Azzam. Thomas Hegghammer 
has described how Azzam “is still an icon of the Islamist movement, and among radicals his stature is only 
matched by Osama bin Laden’s”.[44] He managed to draw tens of thousands of fighters to the area. Perhaps 
more importantly, he took “the first step toward a more global vision of jihad”, although he himself never 
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focused on targeting the far enemy by way of terrorist attacks on foreign soil.[45] The case of Afghanistan 
also shows how internal disagreements arose. Stéphane Lacroix showed that the foreign fighter movement 
in Afghanistan became increasingly split into several camps. Fierce competition arose between, for instance, 
al-Zawahiri and Abdullah Azzam about the young Bin Laden.[46] Another point of contention between the 
two was which enemy should be targeted: the external enemy (according to Azzam) or the apostate Muslim 
regimes (according to al-Zawahiri).[47] Fawaz A. Gerges even goes so far as saying that “it is doubtful that 
transnational jihad would have materialized without the prolonged Afghan war and its socializing and 
mobilizational effects”.[48]
The conflicts in Bosnia and Somalia provided pretexts for the invocation of a defensive jihad. This was 
particularly relevant in the case of Bosnia. The conflict started shortly after Afghanistan had seemed to 
have lost much of its original appeal. Similarly, the Ethiopian invasion in Somalia in 2006 was framed as 
another instance of the “crusaders” attacking the Islamic world. Al-Qaida deputy leader Al-Zawahiri stated 
it as follows: “My Muslim brothers everywhere (...) While I am addressing you today, the crusader invading 
Ethiopian forces are violating the Islamic land of dear Somalia. (…) Here, I am urging the Islamic nation in 
Somalia to be steadfast in this new crusader battlefield, which America, its allies, and the United Nations 
are waging against Islam and Muslims”.[49] A few years later, Bin Laden issued a video titled “Fight On, 
Champions of Somalia”.[50] Conflicts like those in Somalia and Bosnia demonstrated to potential supporters 
what it would mean to be a jihadi and who should be seen as enemies of Islam.
The presence of foreign fighters in these conflicts also managed to draw international attention to the 
cause. The foreign fighters were often aware of the opportunity to frame the conflict in a favorable way. 
During the Bosnian conflict, videotapes were distributed in numerous, mainly Arab, countries, showing 
mutilated corpses and wounded civilians. They added “footage from World War II concentration camps 
to draw parallels between the past slaughter of Jews and the current slaughter of Muslims by European 
Christians”.[51] In Bosnia, the frame was that the West was doing nothing to stop innocent civilians from 
being slaughtered. The jihadis were the only ones coming to help. As reported by Raffaello Pantucci, Lorenzo 
Vidino and Evan Kohlmann in their study of al-Shabaab, these kinds of conflicts ensured that “the global 
jihadist movement also benefits, as it can expand its influence and add credibility to its narrative that Islam 
is under attack from non-Muslims”.[52] Still, some critical remarks about the “ideological success” of these 
conflicts need to be made. Thomas Hegghammer, for instance, has shown how the Bosnian jihad was an 
“anti-climax” for the Saudi jihadi movement “because it never took the proportions of the Afghan jihad and 
because the Arabs were not welcome in Bosnia”.[53]
Another form of ideological fallout was the role played by returned foreign fighters in recruiting others to 
become foreign fighters. In particular, the Arab veterans from Afghanistan gained such a reputation. For 
instance, Abu Hamza al-Masri, became one of the key figures of the Finsbury Mosque in London in the late 
1990s. He had also been in Bosnia, and this experience made him a persuasive recruiter. Another example is 
Anwar Shaaban, a senior leader of Al-Gama’at al-Islamiyya who had fought in Afghanistan and had contacts 
with Sheikh Omar Abdul Rahman and Al-Zawahiri. After obtaining asylum in Italy, he was the central node 
in recruiting Europeans to fight in Bosnia.[54]
The Impact on Societies
The three cases show mixed societal consequences. For instance, there is a difference in the levels of 
polarization that seemed to occur in the home countries. Generally speaking, the relatively low numbers 
of foreign fighters meant that the discussion in the home countries never became quite intense, and that 
reintegration problems of returning foreign fighters seemed to have remained manageable. It was not only 
numbers, but also the public and official stance towards the foreign fighter phenomenon that mattered. 
For instance, during the war in Afghanistan, the fighters could sometimes count on the sympathy of the 
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population in the home country. The American jihadis in Afghanistan were fighting the Cold War enemy 
of the US. As reported by J.M. Berger, this meant that those who went there could still be seen as “good 
Americans”.[55] It is important to stress that these three conflicts took place in very different international 
contexts. During the war in Bosnia, al-Qaida had not yet launched terrorist attacks against the West. The 
attacks on 9/11 drastically changed the attitude of Western countries towards foreign conflicts with jihadi 
elements. Similarly, it also resulted in a different attitude towards the people who aimed to take part in these 
fights. Thus, the post-9/11 context of Somalia and the prominence of the jihadi threat on many security 
agendas in Western countries make this case very different from Afghanistan and Bosnia.
The situation with regard to Bosnia shows similarities with the case of Afghanistan. The numbers of foreign 
fighters were too low to lead to much upheaval in the (at least Western) countries where the fighters departed 
from. Also, it has been said that the presence of foreign fighters was “tacitly consented to both by Bosnians 
and by the international community”, similar to what happened in Afghanistan.[56] Here again, the 
sympathetic media reporting regarding the conflict “opened up the pool of recruits to a much wider range”.
[57] However, the departure of foreign fighters from Western countries did at times lead to suspicion and 
investigations. This was particularly relevant in a number of key recruitment centers, such as in Milan. In 
1995, during operation “Sphinx” of the Italian intelligence agency, seventeen militants were arrested at the 
Intercultural Institute (ICI) while many more were subject to investigation.[58] Interestingly, wider pressure 
on the authorities to close the institute did not materialize when its links to the Bosnian jihad became 
apparent. This only happened after the attacks on 9/11 when it became clear that the ICI seemed to be “one of 
Al Qaeda’s main recruiting stations” in Europe.[59]
Instead of polarization or securitization within the countries where the foreign fighters left from, the 
Bosnian case shows how this could occur within the post-conflict country itself. This is linked to the issue 
of reintegration of fighters. After the 1995 Dayton Agreement, foreign forces were officially ordered to leave 
the country within thirty days. The foreign fighters, however, were in many cases granted citizenship as 
a reward for their fighting efforts. This allowed them to stay, and it has been estimated that at least 700 to 
1000–but some sources report up to 3,000 militants [60]–of them have stayed. They mostly formed their 
own enclaves in former Serb towns surrounding Maglaj, reportedly with sharia law in place.[61] However, 
it was also said that many of the fighters married widowed Bosnians and lived “undisturbed with their new 
families in other people’s [former Serb] houses”.[62] After 2000, when some Serbs reclaimed their original 
houses, the Bosnian government evicted the former fighters from these villages. Whereas there was perhaps 
only limited integration of these fighters into the new Bosnian state, real violent incidents seemed to have 
been rare. However, tensions between the Bosnian Muslim population and the often much more conservative 
foreign fighters incidentally rose. Some report that there was a “cultural and religious uneasiness” between 
the two.[63] That uneasiness slowly transformed into something more pressing, namely a general fear that 
the “potentially threatening forms of Islam that the Mujahideen had brought with them to Bosnia were 
spreading, and that any potential ties the former Mujahideen may have to al-Qaida were threatening to turn 
the country into a sanctuary for terrorists and terrorist training”.[64]
This shows how the presence of foreign fighters was initially accepted as a simple fact of post-conflict Bosnia, 
but was later securitized by the Bosnian government and international actors, especially after the attacks 
on 9/11. These attacks formed a major turning point in the Bosnian authorities’ stance towards the former 
fighters, as they decided to withdraw the citizenship of many of them. A proven link to 9/11 or terrorist 
activity is still disputed.[65] As reported by Jennifer Mustapha, their mere past as former jihadi fighters was 
enough to invoke this idea of a threat.[66] According to Stephanie Zosak, ‘[t]his scrutiny of the mujahideen is 
a direct response to pressure the international community has put on the Bosnian government to take action 
against these individuals due to concerns that they may use Bosnia and Herzegovina as a base for promoting 
and perpetrating acts of terrorism”.[67] However, other sources suggest that it might be oversimplified to 
claim that the perception of the former foreign fighters as a threat was only motivated by some kind of 
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political agenda. It has been said that the Bosnian State Intelligence Agency (OSA) had been genuinely 
worried about the lack of integration of some of these former fighters and the consolidation of Islamist 
networks in parts of the country.[68]
In the case of Somalia, the situation is different. Most foreign fighters joined al-Shabaab that is on the lists 
of designated terrorist organizations of, amongst others, the US and UK.[69] Michael Taarnby and Lars 
Hallundbaek point to the UK and the Scandinavian countries as places where recruitment for al-Shabaab 
has been particularly problematic.[70] In their attempts to interview members of the Somali Diaspora 
community in Denmark about their views on the terrorist organization, the authors were confronted with a 
lot of hesitation to cooperate. Many in the Somali Diaspora find this topic extremely sensitive to talk about, 
and are sometimes threatened by those with sympathies for al-Shabaab if they speak out.[71] Many European 
countries regard foreign fighters who have joined the conflict in Somalia to be a potential threat, as can for 
instance be seen in a 2010 statement by the British head of MI5, who said that Somalia had become one of 
the most serious bases for potential attacks against the UK.[72] This means the Somali diaspora communities 
are experiencing pressure from several sides: from within – where talking about al-Shabaab to outsiders is 
not allowed – but also from outside, as the debate about Somali youth leaving to fight is sometimes tied to 
debates about immigration and integration of minorities. There is, however, another side to polarization that 
seems to have been more prominent in these cases: stigmatization within Somali diaspora communities. In a 
US Congressional Hearing, a Somali community leader and uncle of a foreign fighter called Osman Ahmed 
voiced his frustration and difficulties with sharing information with the authorities. Ahmed stated that:
“… we have been painted as bad people within the Somali community by the mosque management. We have 
been threatened for just speaking out. Some members of Abu-Bakr Al-Saddique mosque told us that if we 
talk about the issue, the Muslim center will be destroyed and Islamic communities will be wiped out. They tell 
parents that if they report their missing kid to the FBI that FBI will send the parents to Guantanamo Jail. And 
this message has been very effective tool to silence parents and the community”.[73] 
This statement illustrates how members are stigmatized within their own community and how they are 
afraid to speak out. Ahmed also testified how entire families are affected by the decision of a child to travel to 
Somalia. Not only do these families have to cope with their own anger and sadness, the stigmatization makes 
them unwanted elements within their own environment.
Reports about the impact foreign fighting could have on the former fighter himself are usually anecdotal 
in nature. The cases or stories that managed to attract attention are often tied to some broader political 
discussion. One such case is Imad al-Husein, a Syrian national who fought along the foreign fighters in 
Bosnia, received citizenship, married a Bosnian widow and continued to live in the country.[74] Following 
the attacks on 9/11, however, al-Husein lost his citizenship, and in 2008, he was planned to be deported to 
Syria.[75] Al-Husein won an EHCR court case that prevented his deportation. The result was some kind of 
“legal limbo” that forced him to live in a deportation center for years.[76] His case attracted a lot of attention 
and rallies were organized to block his deportation, which – according to a leaked cable of the US Embassy 
in Sarajevo – was the result of a “skillful public relations campaign (…) [to] highlight (…) his role in the 
war in order to appeal to Bosniak public opinion.” At the same time the case also “has the potential to be 
appropriated by Bosnian Serbs for nationalist purposes as demonstrated by the sensationalist coverage of the 
Zenica rally in the RS press”.[77] This shows how such cases could be exploited by multiple actors.
The issue of PTSD rarely surfaces in reports about foreign fighters. There is little reason to assume this means 
it has not been an issue for some of these fighters. Several studies have linked combat experience as a risk 
factor to PTSD.[78] For instance, it has been estimated that between 13 and 20% of the American soldiers 
who have fought in Operation Enduring Freedom and Operation Iraqi Freedom might be suffering from 
PTSD.[79] There is reason to believe this number might be equal, if not much higher among former foreign 
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fighters as some of the “mitigating factors” that are often present in official armies – good training and proper 
aftercare – seem to be absent.
Potential Fallout of Jihadi Foreign Fighting in Syria and Iraq 
Before summarizing the extent to which the three types of fallout have been observed in these three cases, 
one final question will be addressed. Against the backdrop of today’s large presence of foreign fighters in 
Syria and Iraq, the question arises if we can expect similar types of fallout as shown in the case studies. This is 
a difficult question as the conflict is still on-going and the eventual fallout will be influenced by many factors 
that cannot be foreseen at this moment. Despite these obvious limitations, this section will examine what we 
already see and discuss what to expect.
One difference between the foreign fighter phenomenon in Syria and Iraq today and the historical cases 
relates to the magnitude. Around 5-6,000 European foreign fighters have joined the conflict on the side 
of jihadi groups.[80] Against this backdrop, the magnitude of the fallout can be expected to increase as 
well. The reality of foreign fighters joining a terrorist organization with a transnational agenda is not a new 
phenomenon. As shown in the historical cases, terrorist organizations were present in two of these conflicts 
– Bosnia and Somalia – and were the product of the third one – Afghanistan. In all of the foreign fighter 
movements, there have been elements with a more global than a local agenda, and most of these groups did 
not shy away from using terrorist tactics.
The most visible fallout of the conflict in Iraq and Syria today is the physical threat. For instance, we have 
seen multiple examples of plots and attacks by returnees or sympathizers in European countries (Brussels: 
2014, 2016; Paris: 2015).[81] Foreign fighters who are still in Syria or Iraq have also been involved in 
planning some of these attacks. Most analysts predict that organizations such as Islamic State will continue to 
try to launch attacks abroad, with Europe as one of its main targets.[82] This strong terrorist element makes 
the current conflict fundamentally different from the historical cases of foreign fighters that were discussed, 
and it is therefore not just an example of a particularly large foreign fighter mobilization. This analysis seems 
plausible as IS has been very vocal about its desire to launch terrorist attacks outside the conflict zone. In 
addition to that, IS’ spokesman al-Adnani – again – urged followers of IS in a speech in May 2016 to launch 
attacks independently if they are unable to reach areas of IS control.[83] His call appeared to be related to the 
military losses the organization has been facing lately and the fact that the numbers of new fighters joining IS 
has been declining, forcing IS to “stimulate” attacks in addition to organizing these themselves.[84]
Another crucial difference with the three historical cases is that IS has announced the establishment of a 
“Caliphate” in parts of Syria and Iraq, and could be called a quasi- or proto-state, although it is currently 
facing increasing pressure and losing territory. The Caliphate narrative has strongly affected and even 
partially changed the ideological appeal of joining the conflict.[85] It does not only attract those who wish to 
fight to liberate Muslim lands from foreign “occupation”, but also those whose main aim is to live in what is 
said to be a true Islamic state. The organization tries to convince fighters that they can join something “new” 
in the Caliphate, and that this is the “simplicity and unity that they imagine existed in the earliest days of 
Islam”.[86]
Great uncertainty surrounds what will happen in the “post-conflict country” straddling Syria and Iraq. 
Analyzing the battle near Mosul that started in October 2016, the Soufan Group noted that “deep internal 
sectarian and ethnic divisions will play a significant role in the long-term outcome in Mosul”.[87] The 
position of foreign fighters will be just one of the myriad challenges that Syria and Iraq will have to face. If 
the Islamic State were to be militarily overrun, the question is what will happen to the foreign fighters who 
are still alive. Much will depend on whether foreign fighters will be able to stay in these countries as well as 
the policies that are implemented in their home countries. They might remain in Syria and Iraq when the 
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face prosecution in their home countries. Some might choose to move to countries where they think they can 
escape prosecution.
Foreign fighters might also move to another conflict zone, either in response to policies in the “post-
conflict countries”, or motivated by a desire to continue fighting a jihad elsewhere. This will have regional 
implications. For instance, it has already been observed that foreign fighters are increasingly moving to the 
“next” battle zones, including Libya.[88] This movement of battle-hardened jihadis from one conflict zone to 
the next one would very much align with the insights from historical cases, where those who most strongly 
believed in the transnational duty of conducting a jihad did not choose to return home but continued to fight 
elsewhere. Given the current developments and changes on the ground, it is too early to conclude on what 
might happen.
Another question relates to the potential ideological fallout. The historical cases have shown that the actual 
numbers of fighters or their military accomplishments are not the most important factors when it comes 
to ideological impact. All three cases demonstrated how the experience of foreign fighting contributes to 
a foreign fighter legacy that can affect the strength and expansion of an ideology. The case of Afghanistan 
is the clearest example, which is partially a result of the duration of the conflict and the number of fighters 
involved, but also because of the importance of individuals like Azzam, al-Zawahiri and Bin Laden. Both 
Afghanistan and Somalia showed signs of the extremization of an ideology, while the case of Somalia showed 
how foreign fighters themselves could become victims of power struggles and ideological debates, something 
which might have occurred in all three cases. The case of Syria and Iraq already reveals similar signs of the 
extremization of movements, and partially as a result of that, splits within movements. The current battle 
between IS and Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra – JaN) is an example. Aaron Zelin analyzed 
the struggle between the two groups in 2014, and noted that whereas al-Qaida’s leadership was worried about 
excessive violence and losing support of local communities, the use of extreme methods and their potential 
blowbacks appear to be less of an issue for those who joined IS.[89] Several foreign fighters left JaN to join IS 
when the latter rose to power in parts of Syria. As with the historical cases, we can expect that the conflict in 
Syria and Iraq will remain influential on jihadi ideology in the decades to come. Despite the fact that IS might 
be militarily defeated and that other groups might take over, the experience of having managed to establish a 
self-proclaimed Caliphate with the help of foreign fighters, can be expected to feature prominently in future 
jihadi propaganda and might again attract future fighters.
Where the current case seems to deviate most strongly from the historical cases presented earlier is the 
societal fallout. The “foreign fighter phenomenon” has become the number one security issue in many 
countries. Many resources and much attention are now devoted to this issue. This was clearly not the case 
in most of the historical cases of foreign fighters, where it was often condoned in their countries of origin 
and not regarded to be an important security issue. Today the foreign fighter issue has become strongly 
securitized and criminalized, and has increased levels of fear of terrorism in European countries.[90] Other 
indicators of the potential societal fallout are polarization and distrust. Reciprocal radicalization between 
jihadis and other Islamists on the one hand and anti-Islam movements on the other hand is one aspect of 
this. Polarization and tensions between communities are for instance visible in the actions of right-wing 
popular movements such as Pegida – the Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West. One 
well-known Pegida-sympathizer, Felix Menzel, for instance stated in one of the first interviews after the 
organization was founded in late 2014 that he believed “that what is unfolding in Iraq and Syria at the 
moment is a clear harbinger of the first global civil war”.[91] Organizations like Pegida show how the issue of 
foreign fighters and broader discussions about (Islamic) radicalization are often tied to other societal issues 
such as immigration.
Another example of this increasing distrust and polarization is the pressure put on Muslim communities 
to speak out against IS and terrorism. In a study of the German Institute for International and Security 
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Affairs, it is stated that “these demands reinforce negative associations of Islam with terrorism and violence, 
and nourish threat perceptions and anti-Islamic prejudices, which in turn contribute to Muslims feeling 
increasingly excluded in Europe. Extremists can take advantage of this alienation for recruiting purposes”. 
[92] While this statement is not limited to the foreign fighter phenomenon but holds for jihadism in general, 
the issue of large numbers of Muslim citizens leaving to fight for jihadi causes has brought the issue much 
closer to home in many parts of the world.
Conclusion
This article approached the potential fallout of today’s jihadi foreign fighter phenomenon by not only 
looking at the potential terrorist threat posed to Western countries but by also discussing its ideological 
and societal dimensions. After examples of these types of fallout were provided, three historical cases of 
jihadi foreign fighting were examined. These three cases showed a somewhat mixed picture. With regard to 
the physical threat, all three cases indicated that this was clearly present. The scenario of returning foreign 
fighters launching attacks does not appear to have featured very prominently in these three historical cases. 
However, examples were found of foreign fighters who remained abroad and launched attacks, or who moved 
to a next conflict zone, especially in the case of Afghanistan. In addition, the three cases demonstrated that 
the presence of foreign fighters often led to conflictual relations with local militants, and that they were not 
always welcome. The case of Somalia provided an example of how a foreign fighter who was prevented from 
travelling to the conflict zone eventually became implicated in terrorist activity in the home country.
Regarding the ideological fallout, all three cases contributed to the strengthening of a foreign fighter legacy, 
although more so in the case of Afghanistan, than Bosnia and Somalia. The idea of fighting a “defensive 
jihad” to protect a transnational Muslim community still resonates today. In addition, spokesmen of foreign 
fighters managed to frame the conflict and their enemies in ways that boosted ideological impact. Returning 
fighters also played key roles in recruitment and managed to transform their real or alleged battlefield 
accomplishments into heroic stories about their jihadi experiences. Their street-credibility and status as 
returned foreign fighters should not be underestimated.
When it comes to societal fallout, polarization and securitization in European home countries appeared to 
have been a relatively minor issue historically, although the case of Somalia deviated from this. Whereas 
foreign fighters in Bosnia and Afghanistan could mostly count on support or passive tolerance within their 
home countries, this was not the case with regard to Somalia. In this post-9/11 context, foreign fighters 
joined an organization that was listed by many countries as a terrorist organization. The Somali case also 
showed how families of foreign fighters might become affected in the home country. Societal fallout in the 
post-conflict country was most visible in the case of Bosnia, where foreign fighters were initially welcomed 
but later became unwanted elements. This was partially the result of securitization processes following the 
attacks on 9/11 when new views on jihadism and international pressure resulted in changed attitudes towards 
former foreign fighters, who were increasingly viewed as a potential threat. However, it was also partially the 
result of reintegration problems and tensions between the former foreign fighters and the local population in 
Bosnia itself.
These three cases illustrate how the fallout of the foreign fighter phenomenon encompasses more than the 
possible terrorist threat posed to Western countries by returning foreign fighters. In the case of Syria and 
Iraq, we have already seen that this latter threat is real. However, the threat for the region itself, as well as 
the potential fallout related to the ideology and especially the societal dimensions need to be acknowledged. 
There are indications of a potentially substantial ideological and societal fallout from the wars currently 
raging in the Middle East. Whereas authorities are already devoting much of their attention to curbing the 
(potential) terrorist threat, it is as important to pay closer attention to the challenges that are linked to the 
other two dimensions.
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